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SEEKING ASYLUM ALONE: USING THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
PRINCIPLE TO PROTECT 
UNACCOMPANIED MINORS 
Joyce Koo Dalrymple*
Abstract: Every year about five thousand children under the age of 
eighteen enter the United States without legal guardians. These child- 
ren must meet the same substantive standards as adults in order to gain 
asylum. As children, they face unique difficulties because they may not 
understand the persecutor’s intent and may not be able to explain their 
experiences as persecution on account of one of the five enumerate 
asylum grounds. Furthermore, they must navigate a confusing legal 
system designed primarily for adults with limited English skills and 
without the assistance of government-appointed attorneys or guardian 
ad litems. This Note argues that the only way to ensure that unaccompa- 
nied children are not deported into dangerous situations is to consider 
the best interests of the child in their asylum determination. This 
reform can be based on the criteria for the special immigrant juvenile 
status, which locates the best interests determination in juvenile courts 
while retaining some decision-making powers in the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
Introduction 
 “When I go to my aunt’s house, or wherever I’m going to live, 
they’ll find me,” sixteen-year-old Edgar Chocoy told his immigration 
judge.1 He fled to the United States from Guatemala two years prior 
because gang members beat him, robbed him, and threatened to kill 
him and his relatives if he left the gang.2 Edgar Chocoy’s grandpar-
ents raised him in Guatemala City, where at the age of ten he was re-
                                                                                                                      
* Symposium Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2005–2006). The 
author wishes to thank her husband for his support and encouragement. 
1 Susan Ferriss, Gangs Thriving in Central America; Youth Caught in a Poverty-Induced 
Criminal Culture, Austin American-Statesman, June 6, 2004, at A17. 
2 Bruce Finley, Bound for Better Life, Deported to Despair, Denv. Post, June 13, 2004, at A1 
[hereinafter Finley, Better Life]. He wanted to leave the gang because he grew tired of the 
crimes the gangs committed. Ferriss, supra note 1, at A16. 
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cruited by a gang.3 A psychiatric evaluation found that Chocoy had 
been so traumatized by gangsters that he tried to commit suicide 
while in detention.4 Despite Chocoy’s prediction that gang members 
would murder him if he returned, the judge denied his asylum case 
and sent him back to Guatemala City on March 10, 2004.5 Seventeen 
days after he was deported, he ventured outside for the first time since 
his return to Guatemala, and a gang member shot him in the back of 
the neck.6 The police never investigated.7
 Chocoy is not alone: his story underscores a defect in U.S. asylum 
law that fails to recognize the unique needs of children fleeing perse-
                                                                                                                      
3 Ferriss, supra note 1, at A16. Chocoy’s father abandoned him, and his mother came 
to the United States as an undocumented worker when he was an infant. Id. After he ar-
rived in the U.S., he soon discovered that the same gangs that infested his barrio in Gua-
temala also plagued his mother’s Pico Union neighborhood. Id. Because his tattoos 
marked him as an enemy of a local gang, he sought the rival gang for protection, which 
led him to trouble with the law. Id. Ironically, the gangs in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras were originally formed in Los Angeles. Alistair Bell, U.S. Gang Violence Explodes in 
Central America, Reuters News, April 6, 2004. Gang members have flooded Central Amer-
ica since Congress passed a law eight years ago that required noncitizens who were sen-
tenced to more than a year in prison to be deported after serving their sentences. Id. 
4 Bruce Finley, Deportee’s Slaying Spurs Reform Push: Advocates Say Teen’s Fear of Gangs Un-
heeded, Denv. Post, April 8, 2004 at A1. Chocoy did not appeal his deportation order be-
cause he told his attorney that he might commit suicide if he were locked up much longer. 
Id. Many immigrant children ask to be deported because they suffer feelings of extreme 
isolation and depression. Jennifer Vergara, Immigration Detention Unjust, Says Conference 
Speaker, Tidings Online, Mar. 30, 2001, http://www.the-tidings.com/2001/0330/immi-
gration.htm. Malik Jarno, a twelve-year-old orphan with mild retardation, was detained for 
three years in adult detention centers. Christopher Nugent, Protecting Unaccompanied Immi-
grant and Refugee Children in the United States, 32 Hum. Rts. Mag. 9, 9 (2005) available at 
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter05/immigrant.html. After authorities arrested Jarno 
for using a false passport, they forgot about his case and failed to take him before an im-
migration judge for eight months. Id. Due to political unrest, his parents were killed and 
his village destroyed in Guinea. Press Release, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, 
Malik Jarno Deserves American Sanctuary (Apr. 22, 2004), http://www.lirs.org/News/ 
NewsReleases/20040422MalikJarno.htm. If sent back to Africa, he likely would have been 
abused and mistreated; there are few services for the mentally challenged in Guinea. Id. 
Jarno’s asylum case was denied, but he finally won on appeal after the longest asylum trial 
in U.S. history. Nugent, supra, at 9. 
5 Finley, Better Life, supra note 2, at A1. Isau Diego’s case is similar to Chocoy’s; he was 
targeted by youth gangs when he lived on the streets after fleeing an abusive parent. Testi-
mony on the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, Subcomm. on Immigration, 107th Cong. 34 (2002) (statement of Wendy Young, Director 
of Government Relations and U.S. Programs, Women’s Comm’n Refugee Women & Chil-
dren), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=172&wit_id [here-
inafter Hearing]. His asylum claim was also denied. Id. After he filed an appeal, INS unlaw-
fully deported him back to Honduras while his appeal was pending. Id. His attorney has 
been unable to locate the boy in Honduras. Id. 
6 Finley, Better Life, supra note 2, at A1. 
7 Id. 
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cution in their home countries.8 Children under eighteen make up 
about half of the world’s refugee population.9 Of these children refu-
gees, approximately two to five percent are unaccompanied by a par-
ent or guardian.10 Each year about five thousand children under the 
age of eighteen enter the United States without legal guardians, and 
are forced to navigate a confusing legal system designed primarily for 
adults.11 Unaccompanied children are arguably the most vulnerable 
population fleeing persecution because, not only are they children 
and refugees, but they also have no primary caretaker.12
 The United States continues to assess children’s claims for asylum 
using the legal standard created for adult asylum seekers.13 Asylum 
seekers must meet the legal standard contained in the definition of a 
“refugee.”14 The U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 incorporated the definition 
of “refugee” from the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, neither of which specifically 
addressed the needs of children.15 The 1980 Act is codified in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which defines a “refugee” as a 
person who is “unable or unwilling . . . [to return to their] country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
                                                                                                                      
8 Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy A. Young, Through a Child’s Eyes: Protecting the Most Vul-
nerable Asylum Seekers, 75 No. 21 Interpreter Releases 757, 757. Children face administra-
tive and adversarial removal proceeding that pit children who have limited English lan-
guage skills against trained trial attorneys. Nugent, supra note 4, at 9. The children must 
meet the same standard of proof as adults and have no right to a government-appointed 
counsel or guardian ad litem. Id. 
9 Women’s Comm’n for Refugee Women and Children, Protecting the Rights of 
Children: The Need for U.S. Children’s Asylum Guidelines 3 (1998), available at 
http://www.womensComm’n.org/reports/index.html#guidelines [hereinafter Women’s 
Comm’n]. According to a world refugee survey conducted by the U.S. Commission for Refu-
gees in 2002, there were over 14.9 million refugees worldwide in 2001. Thomas Alexander 
Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 797 (5th ed. 2003). 
10 See Amnesty International U.S.A., “Why Am I Here?” Children in Immigration 
Detention 7 (2003), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/usa_children_sum 
mary.html; Carolyn J. Seugling, Note, Toward a Comprehensive Response to the Transnational 
Migration of Unaccompanied Minors in the United States, 37 Vand. J. of Transnat’l L. 861, 862 
(2004). 
11 77 Cong. Rec. S7019 (2003) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). According to the Sepa-
rated Children in Europe Project, a joint initiative of the International Save the Children 
Alliance and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 25,000 
separated children are in Europe at any given time. Jacqueline Bhabha, Seeking Asylum 
Alone: Treatment of Refugee and Trafficked Children in Need of Refugee Protection, 42 Int’l Mi-
gration 141, 142 (2001) [hereinafter Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone] 
12 Seugling, supra note 10, at 888. 
13 See, e.g., 77 Cong. Rec. S7019 (2003) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
14 INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(2000). 
15 Women’s Comm’n, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
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count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”16 Since age is not included as a protected 
basis for persecution, a child must establish that his or her persecu-
tion is on account of one of the five enumerated grounds.17
 Children are especially vulnerable to a broad array of human 
rights violations that fall outside the ambit of the five categories for 
protection.18 Children as young as six years old are forced to work as 
bonded laborers or prostitutes.19 Too often, police kill or torture 
street children.20 Military groups recruit or kidnap children as young 
as seven or eight to serve as soldiers.21 For unaccompanied children, 
                                                                                                                      
16 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2000). 
17 Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 761. The Second Circuit noted that “[p]osession 
of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individu-
als with membership in a particular (social) group.” Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d 
Cir. 1991). A child’s persecution can only fall under one of the established grounds when 
they face similar circumstances as adults in regards to race, nationality, religion, and politi-
cal opinion. See Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 764–65. For example, if they refuse to 
participate in a state-supported religious practice, they may be persecuted on account of 
their religion. Id. at 764. Children, whether or not they are capable of holding a political 
opinion, may have a political opinion imputed to them especially when they are members 
of a given family. Id. at 765. In seeking asylum, children face an additional hurdle because 
the adult adjudicator may not believe that the child is mature enough to form a religious 
or political opinion. See Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (noting that 
threats facing children are trivialized). 
18 Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (stating that child abuse, child 
selling, child trafficking, and other forms of child-specific persecution are not considered 
protected under the five enumerated grounds); see Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refu-
gee Children: Detention, Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 159, 162 (1990) 
(noting that most children’s experiences do not fit neatly within the specialized grounds 
for asylum). 
19 Human Rights Watch, Children’s Rights, http://www.hrw.org/children (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2006). 
20 Id. In the case of In re Martinez, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) noted that 
the Honduran police often torture and kill street children. A# 76–312–250 (Bd. of Immi-
gration Appeals 1999), cited in Annette Lopez, Note, Creating Hope for Child Victims of Domes-
tic Violence in Political Asylum Law, 35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 603, 610 (2004). The BIA 
found that an abused and abandoned child who was in danger of becoming a street child 
if returned to Honduras had a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. Similarly, an immigra-
tion judge granted asylum to a Guatemalan child based on membership in a particular 
social group of Guatemalan “street children” who have a well-founded fear of suffering 
persecution such as physical and sexual abuse by government authorities. Matter of A-M-L- 
(Phoenix, Ariz. 2001), cited in IJ Grants Asylum to Guatemalan Street Child, 79 Interpreter 
Releases 440, 440 (2002). 
21 Human Rights Watch, supra note 19. In the case of a fifteen-year-old Salvadoran boy 
who was conscripted to fight with the guerrillas, the immigration judge denied asylum 
even though he found the boy credible and to have a subjective fear of persecution. See 
Cruz-Diaz v. INS, 86 F.3d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1996). The BIA and Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the immigration judge’s denial, holding that the boy’s conscription, flight from the gueril-
las and the army, and fear of retribution from both groups did not establish a political 
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their persecution does not end when the primary conflict or war is 
over.22 Rather, children without the protection of a primary caregiver 
remain particularly vulnerable to forced domestic labor, abuse, and 
other kinds of persecution.23
 These various forms of child-specific persecution can fall under 
three broad groups where the government of the child’s home coun-
try: (1) directly participates in the abuse of the child;24 (2) acquiesces 
in cultural or social practices that can rise to the level of persecu-
tion;25 or (3) fails adequately to protect children from adult caretak-
ers who inflict harm.26 Some advocates argue that in all three catego-
ries, the child is persecuted because of his or her membership in a 
particular social group.27 This argument only succeeds if the child is a 
member of a group that shares a “common immutable characteristic,” 
and he or she was persecuted on account of that membership.28 Some 
                                                                                                                      
opinion. Id. They noted that the same objective standard—whether a reasonable person in 
similar circumstances would fear persecution on account of his political beliefs—should 
apply to the boy and did not tailor the standard to his age. Id. In an unpublished decision, 
the Fourth Circuit also denied asylum to Garcia-Garcia, an El Salvadoran boy who was ab-
ducted by guerillas and forced at gun-point to beat another person with a baseball bat. 
Garcia-Garcia v. INS, 173 F.3d 850, 1999 WL 150822, at *1 (4th Cir. 1999). The court also 
applied the same standard for juveniles as for adults and held that Garcia-Garcia did not 
suffer past persecution within the meaning of the INA. Id. at *2. 
22 Seugling, supra note 10, at 888. 
23 Id. For example, Cambodian resistance groups recruited unaccompanied children 
in Thai border refugee camps. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompanied Children 
into the United States, 7 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 137, 173 (1989). Unaccompanied Cuban chil-
dren were subjected to sexual and psychological abuse in a refugee compound within the 
United States in 1980. Id. 
24 Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 766. The government participates in the abuse of 
a child when they conscript child soldiers or treat the second child as a “non-person” in 
violation of a one child per family policy. Id. 
25 Id. Examples of this second category include child marriage, sati, female genital mu-
tilation, and involuntary child abandonment. Id. 
26 Id. Cases of child abuse, incest, sale, bonded labor, abandonment, trafficking or 
smuggling for prostitution or forced labor fall in this third category. Id. In Aguirre-Cervantes 
v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that a Mexican applicant who was beaten by her father was 
eligible for asylum. 242 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). The court found that she was per-
secuted on account of her membership in her immediate family, which was a “particular 
social group.” Id. at 1175–78. This case opened the possibility that child victims of domes-
tic violence in their homelands may be eligible for asylum, where the government is un-
able to control the persecutor. Lopez, supra note 20, at 604. 
27 Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 766. 
28 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1985) (stat-
ing that the “common, immutable characteristic” must be “an innate one such as sex . . . or 
in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience . . . . [I]t must be one that the 
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because 
it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”). In Matter of Acosta, the 
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argue that unaccompanied minors who experience child-specific per-
secution could constitute a particular social group; thus, allowing 
these children to gain asylum.29 The law, however, does not provide 
for asylum on the social group grounds if the type of harm serves to 
define the particular social group.30 Also, in order to meet the qualifi-
cations for asylum, the particular social group defined must be a suffi-
ciently narrow segment of the population.31
 This Note contends that the only way to ensure that unaccompa-
nied children are not deported into harmful situations is to consider 
the best interests of the child in their asylum applications.32 Part I dis-
cusses why unaccompanied minors have been largely neglected in U.S. 
immigration law and asylum law. Part II examines the principle of the 
best interests of the child and why it should be applied to unaccompa-
nied minors seeking asylum in this country. Part III discusses the cur-
rent treatment of unaccompanied minors in the United States. Part IV 
recommends substantive reforms, modeled after the Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (SIJS) law, that would implement the best interests prin-
ciple for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum.33 The SIJS is a federal 
law that helps abused, abandoned, and neglected children gain lawful 
immigration status if they can establish that it is not in their best inter-
                                                                                                                      
court also noted that it would determine what particular kind of group characteristic will 
qualify on a case-by-case basis. Id. The group’s common characteristic must be sufficiently 
distinct from the general population. Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, Acting Direct. of Int’l 
Affairs, to Asylum Officers, Immigration Officers, and Headquarters Coordinators, INS 
Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims 23 (1998), available at http://uscis.gov/graph 
ics/lawsregs/handbook/10a_ChldrnGdlns.pdf [hereinafter INS Guidelines]. 
29 Seugling, supra note 10, at 891. 
30 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 23. 
31 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (a particular social 
group does not “encompass every broadly defined segment of a population, even if a cer-
tain demographic division does have some statistical relevance”). The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the BIA’s finding that urban, working class males of military age did not constitute 
a particular social group because it is overly broad. Id. at 1577. 
32 See Danuta Villarreal, Comment, To Protect the Defenseless: The Need for Child-Specific 
Substantive Standards for Unaccompanied Minor Asylum Seekers, 26 Hous. J. Int’l L. 743, 777 
(2004) (stating that the current substantive standards leave many unaccompanied children 
without protection and that the government should address this problem using the best 
interests principle). To determine the best interests of the child in domestic family law 
cases, courts consider the parents’ interest for family integrity, the state’s interest to protect 
the minor, and the child’s interest for safety and for a stable family environment. In Re 
Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Conn. 1983) (describing the three competing in-
terests and noting that while the parent and the state each have only one interest, the child 
has two distinct and often contradictory interests). 
33 See discussion infra Part IV (explaining the eligibility requirements and protections 
of the SIJS law). 
2006] Best Interests of Unaccompanied Minors Seeking Asylum 137 
est to be returned to their country of origin.34 With a program mirror-
ing the SIJS law, unaccompanied minors may finally attain the proper 
legal assistance they have long needed and deserved. 
I. Unaccompanied Minors: The Neglected Step-Child of 
Immigration and Asylum Law 
 In an immigration law framework that traditionally affords chil-
dren no independent rights from their parents, unaccompanied mi-
nors are greatly disadvantaged in seeking asylum.35 Since children do 
not have recognized rights of their own in immigration law, by de-
fault, unaccompanied minors are treated as adults and must meet the 
same substantive legal standards as adults.36 Because no significant 
political force has traditionally spoken on their behalf, some argue, 
unaccompanied children have been an unrepresented, cloutless body 
in the political process. 37 A traditional focus upon adults minimizes 
children’s issues so that substantive legal reforms for these children 
have not occurred.38 In sum, unaccompanied minors remain a largely 
neglected group in immigration and asylum law.39
A. No “Child”-hood for Minors Without a Parent 
 In U.S. immigration law, a “child” is defined in relation to a par-
ent; thus the law does not recognize a child without a parent.40 To be 
                                                                                                                      
34 See INA § 101(a)(27)( J); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J) (2000). 
35 See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights 
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 Ohio St. L. J. 979, 991, 1003 (2002) (discussing how immi-
gration law reinforces conceptions of children that inhibit their recognition as legal per-
sons and how unaccompanied children must struggle to overcome that bias). 
36 See Kristine K. Nogosek, Note, It Takes a World to Raise a Child: A Legal and Public Policy 
Analysis of American Asylum Legal Standards and Their Impact on Unaccompanied Minor Asylees, 
24 Hamline L. Rev. 1, 2 (2000) (describing other areas of American jurisprudence where 
children are not required to meet the same legal standards as adults). 
37 Jacqueline Bhabha, Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16 
Int’l J. of Refugee L. 227, 241 (2004) [hereinafter Bhabha, Demography & Rights]. Re-
cently, organizations and networks have started to advocate for immigrant children, in-
cluding the British Refugee Council’s Children’s Section, the Separated Children in 
Europe project and organizations in the United States and Canada. Id. 
38 See Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (stating that some argue that 
there is a normative assumption that refugees are adults, and asylum officials do not ade-
quately consider children’s circumstances). 
39 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 991, 1003. 
40 See INA § 101(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2000). The INA restricts the definition 
of “child” to “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age” who has a particular 
kind of relationship with a parent. Id. For purposes of international law, the Convention 
on Children’s Rights stipulates that a child is anyone under 18 years old unless under the 
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a “child,” one must establish a recognized type of parent-child rela-
tionship such as birth in wedlock, creation of a stepchild relationship, 
bona fide relationship with a natural father, or adoption.41 In family-
sponsored immigration, a child can only immigrate on the basis of a 
parent-child relationship as a beneficiary or derivative of the parent.42 
As a beneficiary, a child must have a parent who is a legal permanent 
resident or citizen to sponsor her application.43 She would have no 
right to force the filing of the petition on her behalf.44 As a derivative, 
she can enter the United States only if her parent’s petition to come 
to the country is granted.45 Conceptions of children as beneficiaries 
or derivatives place them in a passive role, objectify them as family 
possessions, and mitigate their independent legal status.46
 Unaccompanied minors, on the other hand, are disadvantaged 
because they have no parent from which to gain legal status.47 Persons 
under 18, who arrive unaccompanied in the United States, are not 
technically children since a “child” can only exist in relation to a par-
ent according to the Immigration Nationality Act.48 Instead, the gov-
ernment inconsistently substitutes the phrase unaccompanied “mi-
nors” or “juveniles” for the term “child” when referring to separated 
children.49 Unaccompanied minors not only face a setback in terms 
                                                                                                                      
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 1, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 46 [hereinafter CRC]. The Flores Agreement, 
which resulted from a class action case that challenged the detention and release of unac-
companied minors in INS custody, also defines a child as under 18. Bhabha & Young, supra 
note 8, at 759; see Flores v. Reno, 507 U.S. 292, 294 (1993); Hearing, supra note 5, at 38 
(statement of Wendy Young). Professor Bhabha notes that children between 18 and 21 
deserve special consideration under U.S. asylum law, particularly in cases where their asy-
lum claim is based on persecution that occurred before they were 18 years old. Bhabha & 
Young, supra note 8, at 759. 
41 INA § 101(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). 
42 Thronson, supra note 35, at 993–94. 
43 See INA §§ 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 203(a); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (2000). 
44 Thronson, supra note 35, at 994. 
45 INA § 203(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2000); Thronson, supra note 35, at 993. Not only 
are derivatives available for family-sponsored immigrants, but derivative status for spouses 
and children are also recognized in the diversity visa lottery, employment-based petitions, 
and asylees and refugees applications. See id. 
46 Thronson, supra note 35, at 991–92. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 997; see INA § 101(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2000) (defining the term 
“child”). 
49 See Flores, 570 U.S. at 294 (using the term “juveniles”); Administration for Children 
and Families, The Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program, http://www2.acf.dhhs.gov/ 
programs/orr/programs/urm.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (using the term “minors”). 
But see Unaccompanied Alien Child Act of 2005, S. 119, 109th Cong. (2005) (using the 
term “child”). The inconsistent employment of these terms sharply contrasts with the 
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of their marginalized place within the immigration law framework, 
but they also experience unique hurdles to gaining asylum because of 
adult misperceptions.50
1. The Unique Vulnerabilities of Being a Minor 
 The assumption that refugees are normally adults greatly disadvan-
tages children seeking asylum.51 By not distinguishing unaccompanied 
minors from adults, the law gives no consideration to children’s unique 
difficulties in satisfying the same legal standards.52 These minors, who 
usually have limited English skills, are not provided with government-
appointed counsel and often cannot explain their experiences as per-
secution on account of one of the five enumerated asylum grounds.53 
This “on account of” nexus is often more difficult for unaccompanied 
minors to satisfy because children may not understand the persecutor’s 
intent, and furthermore, they may lack a complete understanding of 
the situation itself.54 Additionally, they are not viewed as mature 
                                                                                                                      
thoroughness with which “child” is defined and used in other circumstances. See Thron-
son, supra note 35, at 997. For the purposes of this article, I will use the term unaccompa-
nied minors, separated children, and unaccompanied children interchangeably. 
50 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 991, 1003; Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 
11, at 143 (noting that while age is neutral on its face, children are discriminated against 
because their circumstances are often trivialized). 
51 Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143. 
52 Thronson, supra note 35, at 1002. A smuggling ring brought an eighteen-month-old 
baby into the United States and abandoned her at the Miami airport in May 2000. Wendy 
A. Young, Refugee Children at Risk, 28 Hum. Rts. Mag. 10, 10 (2001) available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter01/young.html. She stayed in an institutional shelter oper-
ated under contract with INS, and appeared at her initial hearing before an immigration 
judge without the assistance of either a lawyer or a guardian ad litem. Id. The immigration 
judge asked an INS attorney to represent the child, creating a conflict of interest. Id. In the 
end, a pro bono legal services program took her case. Id. 
53 See Nugent, supra note 4, at 9. When asked why they fled, children will often answer 
in general terms, saying because of the situation or because of the war. Olivas, supra note 
18, at 162. Without further questioning or counseling, their statements will not meet the 
requirements for a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. Even probing may not help if a 
child has limited knowledge of conditions in their native country. Villarreal, supra note 32, 
at 764. Additionally, children applicants may be less willing or able to talk about why they 
left their home country because doing so would cause them to relive painful experiences. 
INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 5. 
54 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 21. The “on account of” nexus describes the close 
link required between the allegedly persecuting act of the government and the precise 
basis or motive for the oppression, which must be on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion to serve as a valid foundation 
for asylum. Aleinikoff, supra note 9, at 885. The BIA noted, “An asylum seeker is not obli-
gated to show conclusively why persecution has occurred or may occur.” Matter of V-T-S-, 
21 I&N Dec. 792, 796 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1997). 
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enough to have their own political or religious opinions, for which they 
would be persecuted.55 Even children who are political activists in their 
own right or members of targeted families find that their persecution is 
not taken seriously.56 Where the “on account of” nexus is established, 
the applicant must still demonstrate that the government was unable or 
unwilling to protect her from the alleged persecutor.57 This require-
ment assumes that the child had the ability to seek protection from 
government officials.58
 To establish that a fear is well-founded, an asylum applicant must 
show that his or her fear is both subjectively genuine and objectively 
reasonable.59 These two elements are different for children than for 
adults; what may amount to persecution when applied to children, 
might only be considered discrimination or harassment when directed 
at adults.60 Therefore, the adult adjudicator must: (1) take into account 
the subjective impact of disturbing events on a child (which is likely to 
be far greater); and (2) determine what is objectively reasonable for a 
“reasonable” child of the applicant’s age, experience, maturity, and cul-
tural background.61
 A child, for instance, is more likely to be frightened by unfamiliar 
situations and believe improbable threats.62 Witnessing the serious 
harm or death of a close relative may rise to the level of persecution for 
a child insofar as it causes deep disturbance in her.63 This discrepancy in 
a child’s experience, versus that of an adult, is due to the child’s height-
                                                                                                                      
55 See Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (noting that threats facing 
children are trivialized). On the other hand, some unaccompanied minors are viewed with 
suspicion and hostility, as delinquent street children and gang members, which also hurts 
their chances of gaining asylum. Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 240–41. 
56 Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143. 
57 See Matter of Villalta, 20 I&N Dec. 142, 147 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1990) 
(finding that the El Salvador government was unable to control the paramilitary “Death 
Squads”). 
58 Villarreal, supra note 32, at 766. The INS Guidelines state that children who do not 
seek protection do not undermine their cases, but instead the adjudicator must examine 
what, if any, means they had of seeking help and give special attention to government ef-
forts to address the persecution in question. INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 26. 
59 See INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 19. 
60 Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 762, 767. Issues of culture, gender, trauma, the ab-
sence of a caregiver, malnutrition and physical and mental disabilities are only some fac-
tors that may affect a child’s development, which can significantly impact the applicant’s 
testimony. Id. at 771. 
61 Id. at 767. 
62 Id. at 762. 
63 Id. 
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ened sensitivity and dependence.64 Furthermore, traumatic events may 
affect unaccompanied minors more profoundly than other children 
because they cannot turn to those they usually depend on for support 
and, thus, likely experience intensified and often unmitigated emo-
tional and psychological distress.65
2. The Dearth of Children’s Advocacy Groups 
 Child advocacy groups are beginning to place political pressure on 
Congress for greater protections for unaccompanied minors.66 Profes-
sor Jacqueline Bhabha suggests that, until recently, unaccompanied 
minors had no political force to address children’s rights in a compre-
hensive way.67 Traditionally, children’s rights advocates have been di-
vided along domestic and international lines.68 On the domestic front, 
children’s rights activists focus on issues of abandonment, abuse, ne-
glect, and juvenile delinquency.69 On the international front, advocates 
focus on issues such as child war casualties, smuggling, abusive adop-
tion practices, and sex trafficking, but do not address these issues when 
they arise in child asylum applications in the United States.70 In Europe 
and America, networks and organizations are beginning to bridge this 
divide between the field of child welfare and immigration, but more 
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. at 762–63. Bhabha notes that children are more likely to be emotionally dis-
tressed by hostile situations due to their age, lack of maturity, and vulnerability. Id. at 762. 
Furthermore, forced separation of parents may constitute persecution because of the 
child’s particular need for protection and assistance. Id. at 763. 
65 Nogosek, supra note 36, at 11. Nogosek cites a 1991 survey by Neil Boothby of 500 
displaced Mozambique children who had witnessed murder or abuse, had themselves ex-
perienced abuse, or were abducted to be a child laborer or soldier. Id. If the trauma is 
extreme, such as witnessing the death of a parent, then, Boothby notes, that a child may 
experience permanent psychological damage. Id. He observed that children who experi-
ence a loss of hope for the future may experience a chronic reaction that is similar to post-
traumatic stress disorder. Id. 
66 Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 241. The INS Guidelines and legisla-
tive actions are largely a result of the efforts of networks in the United States. Id. Bhabha 
also attributes the small but growing number of affirmative decisions in children’s asylum 
cases to the work of these coalitions. Id. 
67 Id. Martha Minow attributes the failure of children’s rights initiatives in part to chil-
dren not having the right to vote and not having a lobbying group to speak on their be-
half. Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 288–89 
(1995). 
68 Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 241. Moreover, child welfare law and 
immigration law experts occupy separate legal spheres. Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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needs to be done to campaign for the best interests of the unaccompa-
nied minors seeking asylum.71
II. The Best Interests Principle 
 The best interests of the child principle is the overarching doc-
trine in both U.S. family law practice and international human rights 
norms, as the law has evolved to reflect the status of the child as a per-
son.72 Historically, children were treated essentially as the property of 
their parents; they lacked any articulated rights and relied on adults 
to vindicate their interests.73 During the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the state began to pass laws that ensured the protection and wel-
fare of the child, restricting parents’ unilateral control over their 
children.74 By the midpoint of the twentieth century, most states in 
this country had adopted the best interests standard for custody dis-
putes.75 Finally, in the latter part of the twentieth century, the emerg-
ing view conceptualized children as legal persons with independent 
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. Some advocacy groups encountered by the author during her research in-
clude Save the Children, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and 
Children. See, e.g., Save the Children Home Page, http://www.savethechildren.org (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2005); Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services Home Page, http:// 
www.lirs.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2005); United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
Home Page, http://www.usccb.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2005); Women’s Commission for 
Refugee Women and Children Home Page, http://www.womenscommission.org (last vis-
ited Oct. 16, 2005). 
72 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Status of Children: A Story of Emerging Rights, in 
Cross Currents: Family Law & Policy in the U.S. & England 435, 436, 439 (Sanford 
N. Katz et al. eds., 2000) (discussing how the child is seen as the person whose rights and 
liberties are primary). 
73 Thronson, supra note 35, at 981–82; see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1972) 
(holding that a child need not be given notice or an evidentiary hearing before his parents 
decide to commit him to an institution based on the assumption that parents act in their 
child’s best interest); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972) (exempting Amish 
children from compulsory school attendance by deferring to their parents’ freedom of 
religion and right to control the upbringing of their children as weighed against the state’s 
interest in universal education). 
74 Woodhouse, supra note 72, at 424–25. For example, state laws required that all chil-
dren receive primary education, vaccinations, and restricted child labor. Id. By the end of 
World War II, cases firmly established that the state has a compelling interest to ensure the 
child’s welfare. Id. at 425. Increasingly, parents are not viewed as property owners but as 
fiduciaries, who have a duty to protect and guide their children as they move toward 
adulthood. See Thronson, supra note 35, at 984. 
75 Woodhouse, supra note 72, at 425. These changes reflected a growing understand-
ing of child development, including the emotional and psychological needs of the child. 
Id. 
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rights and interests; they are agents rather than objects of the law.76 
Now parental powers are no longer seen as rights in and of them-
selves, but as a means to advance children’s welfare, which is consis-
tent with the human rights and children’s rights movements occur-
ring worldwide.77 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC or the Convention) best encapsulates the view of 
children’s rights as international human rights.78 With the best inter-
ests of the child as its primary objective, the CRC has gained accep-
tance around the globe.79
A. The Application of the Best Interests Principle in America 
 In the United States, family law courts consider the best interests 
of the child in divorce or adoption custody proceedings and in paren-
tal termination hearings where the child has been abused or ne-
glected.80 To determine the best interests of the child, courts un-
equally balance the following factors: (1) the parent’s interest for 
family integrity; (2) the state’s interest to protect the minor; and (3) 
the child’s interest in safety and a stable family environment.81 By con-
sidering the circumstances of each case, the court determines which 
interests should predominate.82 There is a presumption that absent a 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. Now, under the “mature minor doctrine,” credence is given to the child’s ex-
pressed wishes when he or she is found “capable of appreciating the nature and impor-
tance of the decision.” Leslie A. Fithian, Forcible Repatriation of Minors: The Competing Rights 
of Parent and Child, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 187, 202 (1984); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 
643–44 (1979) (finding that a judge can bypass parental consent for a minor’s abortion if 
the minor is deemed mature and well-informed enough to make her own decision). Stat-
utes frequently specify when mature minors’ views may be heard in custody proceedings. 
See Douglas E. Abrams et. al., Children & the Law: Doctrine, Policy, & Practice 87 
(2d ed. 2003). Statutes also usually allow older children to consent to medical care for 
sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, drug and alcohol abuse and some other medical 
conditions without parental approval. Id. 
77 Woodhouse, supra note 72, at 439. 
78 See CRC, supra note at 40, at art. 3, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46; Thronson, supra note 35, at 
988. 
79 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
80 See Jenina Mella, Termination of Parental Rights Based on Abuse or Neglect, in 9 Causes 
of Action 483, § 11 (2d ed. 2005) (regarding the best interests of the child as the legal 
center of all child custody and placement decisions). 
81 In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Conn. 1983) (describing the three com-
peting interests and noting that while the parent and the state each have only one interest, 
the child has two distinct and often contradictory interests). 
82 Elizabeth P. Miller, Note, DeBoer v. Schmidt and Twigg v. Mays: Does the “Best Interests 
of the Child” Standard Protect the Best Interests of the Child?, 20 J. of Contemp. L. 497, 508–09 
(1994). While all courts recognize the importance of the best interests principle, the com-
peting interests are not weighed equally; most subordinate the child and state’s interests to 
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finding of abuse or neglect, parents act in the best interests of their 
children.83 Only when parents abuse their authority can the state in-
tervene to protect the child’s welfare under the doctrine of parens 
patriae.84 Some state family law statutes consider the best interests of 
the child only after a showing of parental unfitness; others consider 
the best interests of the child concurrently with parental rights.85
 Based on the judge’s broad observation of the people and cir-
cumstances in the child’s life, he weighs the opposing interests in an 
active, highly discretionary process.86 Critics argue that the best inter-
                                                                                                                      
the parent’s fundamental right to the control, care, and custody of their children. Id. at 
504. The Supreme Court has traditionally given greatest weight to biological parents whose 
rights have been deemed fundamental. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925) (finding that a state law requiring students to attend public schools violated the 
liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 400 (1923) (holding that a statute that prohibited the teaching of any language other 
than English violated the right of parents to make decisions for their children). But see 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (recognizing that the state can interfere 
with a parent’s right to make decisions for his or her child if those decisions violate child 
labor laws). Because parental rights are considered fundamental, state impingement of 
this right is subject to strict scrutiny, and must serve a compelling state interest. See Lassiter 
v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (explaining that termination of parental 
rights is a unique kind of deprivation; thus the state must show a powerful countervailing 
interest, that of protection). 
83 Parham, 442 U.S. at 620 (finding that parents can commit their child to an institu-
tion based on the assumption that they act in their child’s best interest without giving no-
tice to their child); see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235–36 (deferring to the parents’ freedom of relig-
ion and right to control the upbringing of their children in exempting Amish children 
from a compulsory school attendance). 
84 Fithian, supra note 76, at 200–01. Parens patriae gives the state authority to protect 
or promote a particular child’s welfare. Abrams, supra note 76, at 18. This differs from the 
state’s police power, which is its inherent power to promote the public health, safety, and 
welfare generally. Id. 
85 Miller, supra note 82, at 508. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court held that a 
state could only permanently terminate parental rights upon showing “clear and convinc-
ing evidence” of parental neglect or unfitness. 445 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
86 See In Interest of Brandon S.S., 507 N.W.2d 94, 107 (Wisc. 1993) (stating that the de-
termination depends on the court’s “first-hand observation and experience with the persons 
involved”). In evaluating the child’s circumstances, states vary in the factors they consider. 
Miller, supra note 82, at 509. Usually, states consider the child’s past abuse or neglect, the 
child’s future possibilities of gaining nurture and support from his or her parents, and the 
child’s desires. Mella, supra note 80, at 503. Some states explicitly list multiple factors, while 
others states direct courts to consider the best interests of the child without further direction. 
Miller, supra note 82, at 509; see, e.g., In re S.A.W., Jr., 131 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(noting that the following factors should be considered in a best interest determination to 
terminate parental rights: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs 
of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger of the child now 
and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of those seeking custody; (5) the programs avail-
able to assist those individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (6) the plans for the child by 
these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed 
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ests of the child standard is arbitrary, vague, and overreaching.87 A 
Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion noted that it is no wonder that the 
standard often “means one thing to a juvenile judge, another thing to 
adoptive parents, something else to natural parents, and still some-
thing different to disinterested observers.”88 The court’s tendency “is 
to apply intuition in deciding that a child would be ‘better’ with one 
set of parents than with another and then express this intuitive feeling 
in terms of the legal standard of being in the ‘best interests of the 
child.’”89 Some argue that the standard is not suitable at all in custo-
dial placements because courts lack the capacity to discern which op-
tion is in a child’s best interest.90 These criticisms, however, largely 
refer to divorce or adoption context, rather than to parental termina-
tion proceedings where the child has been abused or neglected.91
 There is little dispute concerning the state’s authority to remove 
a child from a dangerous setting where the parent severely abused the 
child.92 Unaccompanied minors who establish that they face the risk 
of serious injury or death if returned to their home country are simi-
                                                                                                                      
placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing parent-
child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent). 
87 Miller, supra note 82, at 509; see Robert E. Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child 
Custody Evaluations: Limited Science in a Flawed System, 6 Psychological Science in the 
Public Interest 1, 1 (2005), available at http://www.psychologicalscience.org/pdf/pspi/ 
pspi6_1_1.pdf (stating that the best interests of the child is a vague rule that puts judges in 
the position of performing an impossible task). 
88 State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Wis. 1973). 
89 Id. 
90 Woodhouse, supra note 72, at 433–34 (listing various critiques of the best interests 
principle). Despite these criticisms, some form of the best interests of the child standard 
lies at the center of all placement and custody proceedings. Mella, supra note 80, at 502. 
91 See Woodhouse, supra note 72, at 434. Other criticisms of the best interests principle 
also apply only in the divorce or adoption context. See id. These criticisms include: femi-
nists asserting that the standard favors fathers by overvaluing men’s more peripheral role 
in child-rearing; others countering that the vague standard continues to discriminate 
against fathers in favor of women; some arguing that the therapeutic approach uncritically 
favors joint involvement which limits the custodial parent’s autonomy; and others express-
ing that the child’s interest should not be prioritized over the interests of the other family 
members. Id. 
92 See, e.g., In re C. Children, 583 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that a 
child whom the mother punished by striking her face with belt buckle was an “abused 
child,” which thereby terminates the parent’s rights); In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (terminating parental rights for appellants, who over seven years made no 
substantial effort to change their unhealthy and unsanitary living conditions to provide 
their children with basic necessities and stability); People in Interest of T.G., 578 N.W.2d 
921, 924 (S.D. 1998) (holding that a mother’s parental rights should be terminated even 
though she was not the abuser, because despite knowing that the stepfather sexually 
abused her daughters, she ignored it and failed to protect her girls). 
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lar to U.S. citizen children who face the risk of harm if returned to 
abusive parents.93 Although the source of the harm may differ, unac-
companied minors, like abused and neglected children, also suffer a 
lack of safety and protection as demonstrated by their experiences as 
child soldiers, laborers, and prostitutes, among other things.94
 The main issue in parental termination hearings is determining 
when the mistreatment rises to the level of abuse or neglect that war-
rants permanent removal, making the child eligible for adoption.95 
Similarly, the main issue in the case of unaccompanied minors should 
be a determination by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
regarding whether the child fears or suffered harm in his or her 
home country.96 In making this finding, DHS should examine 
whether the government of the child’s home country was unwilling or 
unable to protect the child, relying on objective evidence of govern-
ment laws and enforcement.97 The child should not be required to 
demonstrate that she suffered harm “on account of” one of the five 
grounds because of the difficulties of fitting child-specific persecution 
within the ambit of those categories.98 If DHS is satisfied that the 
child establishes the requisite harm, then it should grant asylum if an 
independent body, like a juvenile court, decides it is in the child’s best 
interest not to return to his or her home country.99
                                                                                                                      
93 See Interview with Sanford N. Katz, The Darold and Juliet Libby Professor of Family 
Law, Boston College Law School, in Newton, Mass. (Mar. 18, 2005) (observing that unac-
companied children and abused and neglected children both face an issue of safety). 
94 See id. 
95 Compare In re C. Children, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (noting that abuse consists of a substan-
tial risk of physical injury which would likely cause serious or protracted disfigurement, or 
protracted impairment of his physical or emotional health) (emphasis added), and Raboin 
v. N. D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 552 N.W.2d 329, 334 (N.D. 1996) (stating that actual seri-
ous physical harm or traumatic injury is required for a finding of abuse) (emphasis 
added). 
96 See INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 26 (noting that the child must establish that 
the government was unable or unwilling to prevent the harm). In some situations the gov-
ernment is the persecutor. Id. at 25. 
97 See id. at 26 (recognizing that children may not have had the ability to seek govern-
ment protection, thus recommending that adjudicators consider government efforts to 
protect children). 
98 See Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (stating that child-specific 
persecution is not protected under the five enumerated grounds). 
99 See discussion infra Part VI; Thronson, supra note 35, at 1014 (explaining that juve-
nile courts could make this determination as it does in the case of special immigrant juve-
niles). 
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B. The International Acceptance of the Best Interests Principle 
 In determining whether to apply the best interests principle for 
unaccompanied minors, international law is particularly instructive.100 
The European Union has already adopted a resolution on unaccom-
panied minors, which regards the best interest of the child as a pri-
mary consideration.101 In order to bolster America’s role as an inter-
national human rights leader, the United States should follow suit and 
take greater measures to protect the most vulnerable children of the 
world.102
1. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
most widely ratified human rights treaty, mandates that “in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legisla-
tive bodies, the best interests of the child shall be the primary consid-
eration.”103 Therefore, according to the CRC, the best interests stan-
dard is not only relevant when determining procedural questions but 
also when considering substantive issues pertinent to child asylum 
claims.104 Furthermore, the CRC states in Article 22 that a child seek-
ing refugee status shall receive appropriate protection and humanitar-
                                                                                                                      
100 See Claire L. Workman, Note, Kids Are People Too: Empowering Unaccompanied Minor 
Aliens Through Legislative Reform, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 223, 242 (2004) (advo-
cating for incorporating a “child’s views” approach because it adheres to international 
law). 
101 Council Resolution 97/C, 221/03, preamble, 1997 O.J. (C 221) 23. 
102 See Amnesty Int’l USA, Letter to a U.S. Senator Supporting Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, http://www.amnestyusa.org/children/crn_sampleprint.html. (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Amensty Int’l USA] (ratifying the CRC would enhance 
America’s role as international human rights leader). 
103 CRC, supra note 40, at art. 3, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46 (emphasis added); Women’s 
Comm’n, supra note 9, at 5. The first legal step in promoting the rights of the child occurred 
in 1924 with the first Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Youth Action Course on the 
United Nations & Human Rights, http://www.unac.org/yac/childrensrightsconvention.htm 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2006) [hereinafter YAC, Convention]. In 1948, the second Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child built upon the first by “recognizing that Mankind owes to the child 
the best that it has to give . . . .” Id. A more detailed Declaration followed in 1959. Id. Whereas 
declarations are statements of moral and ethical intent and are nonbinding, conventions or 
covenants are legally binding. Id. In 1978, Poland proposed a draft of the CRC, which would 
become the first legally binding instrument regarding children’s rights. Id. The United Na-
tions subsequently revised and adopted it as the Convention of the Rights of the Child on 
November 1989 and entered it into force in September 1990. Id. 
104 See CRC, supra note 40, at art. 3, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46. 
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ian assistance, and enjoy the rights set forth in the Convention and 
other international human rights instruments.105
 The Convention formally recognizes children’s rights as human 
rights because they are fundamental rights inherent to the human 
dignity of all people, regardless of age.106 This notion means that 
children are rights-holders, whose views must be taken into considera-
tion.107 For this purpose, Article 12(2) states that “the child shall in 
particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body . . . .”108 Parents and 
the community are fiduciaries, entrusted with helping the child exer-
cise her rights rather than substituting their voice for the child’s.109 
Therefore, this “views of the child” approach turns children from pas-
sive objects of the law into active agents.110
 The United States signed the Convention in February 1995, but 
has not yet ratified it.111 Because the United States extensively scruti-
nizes international treaties to assess their constitutionality before rati-
fication, the process can take decades, which could be true for the 
CRC given its controversial nature.112 Its political opponents argue 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. at art. 22, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 51. 
106 Id. at Preamble, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 44, 45 (bearing in mind that the United Nations 
Charter reaffirmed the fundamental human rights, dignity, and worth of the human per-
son, and recognizing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed that 
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth without distinction of any 
kind). In light of the international nature of immigration and the necessity of interna-
tional human rights norms to the interpretation of certain aspects of immigration law, 
Professor Thronson argues that “any workable framework for children’s rights in immigra-
tion law must account for the idea of children’s rights as human rights represented by the 
Convention [on the Rights of the Child].” Thronson, supra note 35, at 988. 
107 See CRC, supra note 40, at art. 12(1), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 48 (“State Parties shall assure 
to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”). 
108 Id. at art. 12(2), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 48. 
109 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 989. 
110 See id. 
111 See Amensty Int’l USA, supra note 102. The United States is one of only two coun-
tries that has failed to ratify the CRC. Women’s Comm’n, supra note 9, at 5. The only other 
country that has failed to endorse the CRC is Somalia, which lacks an internationally rec-
ognized government. Id. The United States is bound not to act against the treaty’s purpose 
while the decision to ratify is pending. Workman, supra note 100, at 235. 
112 UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of a Child: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2006) [hereinafter 
UNICEF, Convention]; Amnesty International U.S.A., Children’s Rights: Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, http://www.amnestyusa.org/children/crn_faq.html (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2006). Unlike many nations that implement treaties incrementally, the United 
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that the Convention impedes parental rights by giving the govern-
ment too much responsibility for the well-being of the child.113 They 
also portray the CRC as threatening national and state sovereignty by 
dictating how to raise children.114 Yet, the larger debate surrounding 
the rights of parents vis á vis the government is inapplicable to unac-
companied children because they lack an adult guardian and are in 
need of state protection.115 Therefore, regardless of the ratification 
question, the United States should adhere to the CRC’s “best interests 
of the child” and the “views of the child” principles in the specific in-
stance of unaccompanied children seeking asylum.116
2. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Guidelines 
 In 1997, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) issued guidelines based on the CRC’s international princi-
ples on children’s rights.117 The UNHCR’s “Guidelines on Dealing with 
Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum” stipulate that “the basic 
guiding principle in any child care and protection action is the principle 
of the best interests of the child.”118 It notes that if a child is not granted 
                                                                                                                      
States first attempts to ensure that all federal and/or states laws satisfy the standards of the 
treaty. Id. The United States ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide after a thirty-year process and signed the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women more than twenty years ago but has 
yet to ratify it. Id. Furthermore, the United States usually considers only one human rights 
treaty at a time. UNICEF, Convention. The question remains whether the CRC is or will be 
considered customary international law. Women’s Comm’n, supra note 9, at 5. Customary 
international law “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them 
from a sense of legal obligation.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States § 102 (1987). 
113 Nogosek, supra note 36, at 19. See CRC, supra note 40, at art. 2, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46 
(noting that State Parties shall ensure the rights of the child). 
114 Amensty Int’l USA, supra note 102. 
115 See id. (providing a few of the issues in the debate). 
116 See Villarreal, supra note 32, at 777 (explaining how the CRC’s best interests princi-
ple should be implemented in legislation, regulation, and adjudication of unaccompanied 
minors’ asylum applications). 
117 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on 
Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum 4 
(1997), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5S5BY7?OpenDoc-  
ument [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines]; see also Rachel Bien, Note, Nothing to Declare But 
Their Childhood: Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the Rights of Children, 12 J.L. & Pol’y 797, 
812 (2004). 
118 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 117, at 1. The UNHCR Guidelines, unlike the 
CRC, does not consider the “views of the child.” See CRC, supra note 40, at art. 12(1), 1577 
U.N.T.S. at 48 (stating the CRC’s consideration of the child’s views); Workman, supra note 
100, at 240. 
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asylum, then an assessment of the solution that is in the best interests of 
the child should follow as soon as practicable.119 The UNHCR Guide-
lines also highlight human rights abuses that may constitute persecution 
for children, but not for adults.120 These situations include “the re-
cruitment of children for regular or irregular armies, their subjection to 
forced labour, the trafficking of children for prostitution and sexual ex-
ploitation and the practice of female genital mutilation.”121
 Neither the CRC nor the UNHCR Guidelines require that the 
child’s best interests be the only determining criterion, but instead 
mandate that the decision makers consider the child’s perspective by 
identifying the child’s best interest as “the primary consideration” or 
“the basic guiding principle.”122 Mandating that the child’s voice be 
highly valued decreases the likelihood that the best interests standard 
will devolve into a vehicle for adults’ opinions.123 Listening to the 
child’s voice may prevent adult illusions about children from prejudic-
ing the asylum process and force adults to face the painful reality of 
                                                                                                                      
119 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 117, at 3. Other provisions that UNHCR Guide-
lines recommend include appointing legal representation and a guardian or advisor with 
child welfare expertise to safeguard the child’s interests. Id. §§ 4.2, 5.7. It further prohibits 
their detention in prison-like conditions, establishes an expedited procedure to process 
their claims, and takes into account each child’s stage of development and particular vul-
nerabilities when assessing his or her claim. Id. §§ 7.6, 8.1, 8.5, 8.6. 
120 Id. § 8.7. 
121 Id. This approach would recognize persecution that is unique to child applicants, 
which may be central to the child’s asylum claim. See Bien, supra note 117, at 831. Many 
advocates argue that child-specific persecution should be acknowledged as a ground for 
protection. See Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 766 (noting that children who experience 
certain kinds of child-specific persecution suffer harm because of their membership in a 
particular social group). 
122 See CRC, supra note 40, at art. 3, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46; UNHCR Guidelines, supra 
note 117, at 1. As Professor Woodhouse comments, “[a]sking the child question[s], listen-
ing to children’s authentic voices, and employing child-centered practical reasoning are 
not the same as allowing children to decide. They are strategies to insure that children’s 
authentic voices are heard and acknowledged by adults who make decisions.” Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 1747, 1840 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Child-Centered]. 
123 Thronson, supra note 35, at 989. One scholar notes that because the CRC does not 
list any factors in determining the child’s best interests, adjudicators may interfere with the 
application of the best interests test by employing their own value judgments. Villarreal, 
supra note 32, at 758. Professor Woodhouse asserts that the child-centered perspective is 
less about the parents’ rights versus the child’s rights, and more about recognizing the 
adults’ responsibility and children’s needs. Woodhouse, Child-Centered, supra note 122, at 
1815, 1864. 
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the child’s experience.124 Some countries, such as Canada and the 
United Kingdom, provide avenues to listen to the child’s voice.125
3. Canada & the United Kingdom 
 Canada and the United Kingdom took steps to ensure that their 
asylum laws more closely reflected the international standards even be-
fore the UNHCR Guidelines were issued.126 Of all asylum claims filed 
worldwide, a high percentage were lodged in both countries.127 In 
1996, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board, the federal agency 
charged with asylum claims, issued progressive guidelines concerning 
child applicants.128 It provides for the appointment of a “designated 
representative” for every child refugee claimant, whether accompanied 
or unaccompanied, whose duty is to act in the best interests of the 
child.129 Instead of designating a representative, the United Kingdom 
established the Refugee Council Panel of Advisors for Unaccompanied 
Refugee Children in 1994.130 Independent of the U.K. Immigration 
and Nationality Department, this children’s panel provides advice and 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Woodhouse, Child-Centered, supra note 122, at 1837 (explaining how listening to 
the child’s voice entails setting aside adult illusions and confronting children’s realities). 
125 See Bien, supra note 117, at 813–15. See generally Immigration & Refugee Board, 
Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues (1996), available at 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/child_e.htm [hereinafter Canada Guide-
lines]; U.K. Immigrant and Nationality Directorate, Unaccompanied Children § 352 
(1990), available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/laws___policy/immi 
gration_rules/part_11.html [hereinafter UK Policies]. 
126 Women’s Comm’n, supra note 9, at 5, 6. 
127 UNHCR, Asylum Levels & Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2004, at 8, 
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=search (listing that the 
UK had 10 percent, Canada had 6 percent, and the United States had 13 percent of all 
asylum seekers in 2004). 
128 Bien, supra note 117, at 813–14. 
129 Canada Guidelines, supra note 125, at A(II). Before finalizing the designation, a 
panel informs him or her of the various duties of the designated representative and as-
sesses his or her ability to fulfill those duties. Id. While an adult friend or relative is often 
the designated representative in Canada, the UNHCR’s Guidelines go further by recom-
mending guardians who have expertise in child welfare. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra 
note 117, at 2 (stating that the guardian should have the “necessary expertise in the field 
of childcaring, so as to ensure that the interests of the child are safeguarded and that 
his/her needs are appropriately met.”); Canada Guidelines, supra note 125, at A(II) (re-
quiring only that the person have an appreciation of the nature of the proceedings, not 
have a conflict of interest, and be willing and able to fulfill the duties of the designated 
representative). 
130 Bien, supra note 117, at 815. Advisors with expertise in education, social services, 
probation, health, and legal work are included on the panel. Bhabha & Young, supra note 
8, at 769. 
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support to child applicants to ensure that they receive legal representa-
tion, care, and accommodation.131
 Canada’s guidelines also establish a panel that considers the 
child’s maturity and development both at the time of the hearing and 
at the time of the detrimental events in order to determine the best way 
to elicit evidence from the child.132 Further, where a child has difficulty 
testifying in front of decisionmakers, videotaped evidence or expert 
testimony can replace the child’s direct testimony.133 The guidelines 
also stipulate that consideration should be given to selecting the person 
who is best able to question the child.134 In assessing the evidence, the 
adjudicators take into account the child’s ability to recall the past given 
her age, gender, cultural background, post-traumatic stress, or other 
circumstances.135
 Likewise, in the United Kingdom, an adult representative or 
guardian should attend immigration interviews.136 According to the 
U.K. Immigrant and Nationality Directorate, the interviewer should 
be sensitive to the child’s feelings of inhibition or alarm, allow the 
child to express herself in her own way and at her own speed, and 
stop the interview when the applicant appears tired or distressed.137 
The U.K. laws state that asylum should not be denied solely because 
the child does not understand the situation or has not formed a well-
founded fear of persecution due to the child’s lack of maturity.138
                                                                                                                      
131 Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 769. The advisors help children locate legal 
counsel, and are responsible for the child’s education, shelter, health care, and other wel-
fare needs throughout the asylum process. Bien, supra note 117, at 815–16. The advisors 
establish rapport with the child and accompany her to interviews. Bhabha & Young, supra 
note 8, at 769. 
132 Canada Guidelines, supra note 125, at A(III)(6), B(I). 
133 Id. at B(I)(5). This approach is used in child abuse cases in the U.S. criminal justice 
system. Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 772. 
134 Canada Guidelines, supra note 125, at B(I)(4). In addition, the guidelines suggest 
using an informal interview room rather than a courtroom, and allowing adults whom the 
child trusts to attend the hearing whether or not he or she is the designated representa-
tive. Id. at B(I)(3). 
135 Id. at B(II)(1). 
136 UK Policies, supra note 125, § 352. 
137 Id. According to child welfare experts, repeated questioning or cross-examination 
negatively affects reliability and consistency in children’s responses. Bhabha & Young, su-
pra note 8, at 771. 
138 UK Policies, supra note 125, § 351. Adjudicators pay close attention to the welfare 
of the child throughout the process. Id. 
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III. The Current Approach in the United States 
 The Department of Homeland Security has acknowledged the im-
portance of the best interests principle and made great strides to in-
corporate this standard procedurally through the INS Guidelines and 
the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act (UACPA), which has 
passed the Senate and is pending approval in the House.139 The United 
States, however, has stopped short of making substantive changes to the 
law.140 Since procedural improvements only provide children fairer ac-
cess to the asylum system, unaccompanied children are still marginal-
ized in the legal proceedings.141 This disparate treatment of unaccom-
panied minors may be explained by the conflicting policy objectives 
regarding humanitarian values versus economic, national security, and 
political concerns in the admission of immigrants.142
 Certainly, the use of the best interests principle in admitting un-
accompanied children is part of a wider policy debate over refugee 
admissions.143 Admitting a growing number of asylum applicants con-
flicts with an increasing public awareness of finite national resources 
and unsatisfied domestic needs.144 Given the economic, ethnic, and 
political resistance to admission, countries limit their intake of immi-
grants to “politically tolerable levels.”145 In the United States, national 
security concerns since September 11 often overshadow the human 
                                                                                                                      
139See INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 2. See generally Unaccompanied Alien Child 
Protection Act of 2005, S. 119, H.R. 1172, 109th Cong. (2005). Senator Dianne Feinstein 
reintroduced the UACPA in the Senate on January 24, 2005, and Representative Zoe Lof-
gren reintroduced the bill in the House on March 8, 2005. See 151 Cong. Rec. E. S303 
(2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 151 Cong. Rec. E. 383 (2005) (statement of Rep. 
Lofgren). The bill was first introduced in the Senate on May 22, 2003, and in the House on 
October 21, 2003, but it never passed the House. See generally S. 1129, H.R. 3361; 77 Cong. 
Rec. S7019 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
140 See INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 2. 
141 See Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 243. 
142 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Techniques for Managing High-Volume Asylum Sys-
tems, in Immigration Controls: The Search for Workable Policies in Germany & 
the United States 117 (Kay Hailbronner et al. eds., 1998) (stating that as the world refu-
gee population has increased, refugee-receiving countries balance humanitarian values 
against economic, social, law enforcement, and political concerns) [hereinafter Legomsky, 
The New Techniques]. 
143 See Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker’s Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World, 14 
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 619, 620 (2000) (discussing the competing values that all receiving na-
tions must balance in determining whether to admit refugees) [hereinafter Legomsky, Bill 
of Rights]. 
144 Legomsky, The New Techniques, supra note 142, at 117. 
145 Legomsky, Bill of Rights, supra note 143, at 620. 
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rights of noncitizens, which could have a detrimental effect on unac-
companied minors.146
 Security and enforcement concerns usually clash with the best in-
terests of the unaccompanied minor.147 Many children are less able to 
express their views or bring best interests considerations to the atten-
tion of adjudicators, where they experience harsh immigration meas-
ures such as threats of removal or indefinite detention.148 These con-
flicting policy objectives may help explain why the United States has 
been reluctant to extend the best interests principle to substantive asy-
lum law.149 As enforcement concerns increasingly dominate the politi-
cal agenda, the United States must ensure that the interests of unac-
companied minors are not marginalized.150 The INS Guidelines for 
Children’s Asylum Claims and the Unaccompanied Child Protection 
                                                                                                                      
146 See Daniel Kanstroom, Legal Lines in Shifting Sand: Immigration Law & Human Rights 
in the Wake of September 11th, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 1, 5 (2005) (stating that the use of 
immigration control for security purposes does not relate to immigration policy directly); 
Jessica G. Taverna, Note, Did the Government Finally Get It Right? An Analysis of the Former INS, 
the Office of Refugee Resettlement & Unaccompanied Minor Aliens’ Due Process Rights, 12 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 939, 977 (2004) (noting that DHS’s emphasis on national security and 
law enforcement, as reflected in the US PATRIOT Act’s allowance of detaining noncitizens 
indefinitely, will undermine the best interests of the child in regard to their detention 
status). 
147 Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the Transnational Mi-
gration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 269, 282 (2000) [herein-
after Bhabha, Lone Travelers]. 
148 Id.; see also Heaven Crawley & Trine Lester, Save the Children UK, No Place for 
a Child: Children in UK Immigration Detention: Impacts, Alternatives and Safe-
guards 22 (2005), available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/temp/scuk/cache/cmsat 
tach/2442_no%20place%20 for%20a%20child.pdf (discussing the combination of nega-
tive detention impacts on children which can result in difficulties in presenting clear ac-
counts). Detained children experience negative mental and physical symptoms such as 
depression, lack of appetite, persistent coughs, and other sicknesses. See id. at 24. 
149 See id. Some attribute this restrictive application of the best interests principle to the 
uncertain scope of liberties of aliens and children. See Gail Q. Goeke, Substantive and Proce-
dural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 221, 233–34 (1995) (re-
ferring to the holding in Flores v. Renos, which limited the best interests of the child consid-
eration for unaccompanied minors detained by INS). Goeke discusses the interplay of 
judicial self-restraint, deference to the political branches in immigration matters, and the 
uncertain scope of liberties of aliens and children to explain the court’s refusal to accord a 
fundamental liberty interest of freedom to unaccompanied minors in detention. Id. Judi-
cial deference in immigration matters is frequently referred to as the plenary power doc-
trine. See Nogosek, supra note 36, at 7. The doctrine originated in 1889 with Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, which announced that Congress’s authority to regulate immigration 
through legislation is inherent in U.S. sovereignty. 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, 609 (1889). 
150 See Bhabha, Lone Travelers, supra note 147, at 282. The growing numbers of unac-
companied minors arriving in the United States should alert policy makers that this is not 
a marginal issue. See id. 
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Act are two instruments that advance the best interests of the child in 
procedural matters domestically.151
A. INS Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims 
 The Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims, issued by the INS 
in 1998, bring the United States a step closer to the international best 
interests of the child standard by providing greater procedural protec-
tions.152 The INS Guidelines, however, explicitly disregarded the prin-
ciple in substantive asylum law, stating, “the internationally recog-
nized ‘best interests of the child’ principle is a useful measure for 
determining appropriate interview procedures for child asylum seek-
ers, although it does not play a role in determining substantive eligi-
bility under the U.S. refugee definition.”153 It emphasizes that “re-
gardless of how sympathetic the child’s asylum claim may be,” the best 
interests principle does not alter the refugee definition that children 
must meet.154
 The INS Guidelines incorporate special procedural protections for 
children to create a “child-friendly asylum interview environment.”155 It 
recognizes that children “may not present their cases in the same way as 
adults” and suggests interviewing techniques that “seek to ensure that 
the applicant feels comfortable and free to discuss the claim.”156 More-
over, the INS Guidelines note that children cannot be expected to dis-
                                                                                                                      
151 See generally INS Guidelines, supra note 28; S. 119, 109th Cong. (2005). 
152 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 2, 18. The Women’s Commission for Refugee 
Women & Children recommends widely distributing the Guidelines to anyone who comes 
in contact with children, including border patrol, detention and deportation officers, and 
overseas refugee interviewers. Women’s Comm’n, supra note 9, at 15. The Commission also 
calls on the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the agency in which immi-
gration judges sit, to adopt these Guidelines. Id. Currently, the Guidelines are primarily 
designed for asylum officers in the Department of Homeland Security. Id. 
153 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 2. There are two limited exceptions in which un-
accompanied minor asylum seekers are treated differently than adults. Women’s Comm’n, 
supra note 9, at 6–7. First, unaccompanied minors are exempted from the one-year filing 
deadline because they are deemed to have a “legal disability,” which is a recognized excep-
tion to the filing deadline. Id. at 6. Second, an August 1997 INS memorandum stated that 
unaccompanied minors should not be placed in expedited removal unless the minor 
commits an aggravated felony in the presence of the agency’s officer, has been convicted 
of an aggravated felony, or has been ordered removed from the United States before. Id. at 
7. Expedited removal is when an inspection officer at a port of entry sends an individual 
back to her homeland immediately if she does not have proper documentation and cannot 
articulate a desire to apply for asylum or fear of return. Id. 
154 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 18. 
155 Id. at 5. 
156 Id. 
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cuss their claim with the same degree of accuracy and detail as adults, 
due to developmental and cultural reasons.157 While the burden still 
remains on the child to establish her claim for asylum, the INS Guide-
lines follow the UNHCR’s recommendation that children’s testimony 
should be given a liberal “benefit of the doubt” with respect to evaluat-
ing a child’s alleged fear of persecution.158 Furthermore, the Asylum 
Officer must gather as much objective evidence as possible to evaluate 
the child’s claim.159
 Unlike Canada and the United Kingdom, however, the United 
States does not require a designated representative or a panel of advi-
sors.160 Without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the child’s 
perspective may not be heard because the triangle of the adjudicator, 
child’s attorney, and trial attorney does not create space for the child’s 
own voice.161 In the United States, guardian ad litems are frequently 
mandated in domestic abuse or neglect proceedings and other areas of 
family law.162 The INS Guidelines do allow a “trusted adult” to attend 
the child’s asylum interview, noting that the presence of this adult may 
help the child psychologically.163 While this adult may help the child 
explain his or her claim, the adult may not interfere with the interview 
process or coach the child during the interview.164
                                                                                                                      
157 Id. at 13. 
158 Id. at 26. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, at 
II(C)(2)(219) (1992), available at http://www.asylumsupport.info/publications/unhcr/hand-  
book.pdf. 
159 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 17. The INS Guidelines note that the balance be-
tween subjective fear and objective circumstances may be difficult to assess for children 
because of the difficulty in measuring the minor’s maturity, which is the rationale for giv-
ing more weight to objective factors. Id. at 19. 
160 See id. at 5 n.12 (stating “there is no requirement that a child bring an adult to the 
interview either to serve as a support person, attorney, or accredited representative”); 
Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 768–69. 
161 Bhabha & Young, supra note 8, at 772. 
162 Abrams, supra note 76, at 248; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.011(a) (Vernon 2004) 
(stating that appointment of a guardian ad litem is mandatory in parental termination 
hearings); see, e.g., State ex rel. Perman v. District Court, 690 P.2d 419, 422 (Mont. 1984) 
(noting that the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an incompetent person not 
otherwise represented in an action). 
163 INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 5–6. A trusted adult provides moral support for 
the child and may help to bridge the gap between the child’s culture and the U.S. asylum 
interview. Id. Usually a child’s parent or relative is the support person, but for unaccom-
panied minors another adult can serve as the support person at the Asylum Officer’s dis-
cretion. Id. at 6. 
164 Id. 
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 Moreover, the INS Guidelines do not require legal counsel or 
provide court-appointed counsel for unaccompanied minors, leaving 
less than half of all children in DHS custody without attorneys.165 Yet, 
given the complexity of asylum proceedings, asylum seekers are about 
five times more likely to win their cases if they have representation.166 
For children, gaining asylum without representation is even more 
doubtful because of their inability to understand the proceedings.167 
Without informed assistance, children’s due process rights cannot be 
guaranteed.168
B. The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act 
 The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act (UACPA), which 
has passed the U.S. Senate and is pending in the House, builds upon 
the INS Guidelines and furthers the best interests of the child.169 Most 
notably the UACPA provides representation for unaccompanied mi-
nors by requiring legal counsel and establishing a guardian ad litem 
pilot program.170 The guardian ad litem’s duty would be to “take rea-
sonable steps to ensure that the best interests of the child are pro-
moted” in immigration proceedings.171 About eighty percent of unac-
companied juveniles apprehended by DHS do not have adult assistance 
of any kind, either legal representation or a guardian ad litem.172
                                                                                                                      
165 See id. at 5 n.12; Bien, supra note 117, at 822. 
166 Hearing, supra note 5, at 47–48 (statement of Wendy Young). 
167 Id. at 48. Moreover, most lack basic English skills and are frightened and depressed 
from being separated from their families. Id. at 51 (statement of Andrew Morton, Attorney, 
Latham & Watkins). Given the high stakes of asylum cases, this lack of representation is 
especially disturbing. See id. Furthermore, immigration judges may choose to continue the 
case rather than issue a final order to an unrepresented minor; thus, these children are 
detained for longer periods of time. Id. at 53. This protracted detainment has both emo-
tional costs on the child and financial costs for taxpayers, as daily rates for detention run 
up to $250. See id. Providing attorneys to unaccompanied minors would speed adjudica-
tions and save money in the long run. See id. 
168 Id. at 52. 
169 See generally S. 119, 109th Cong. (2005). 
170 S. 119 §§ 201, 202. 
171 S. 119 § 201(a)(3)(E). UACPA mandates the EOIR to adopt standards for legal 
representation modeled after the INS Guidelines. S. 119 § 202(5). 
172 Hearing, supra note 5, at 52 (statement of Andrew Morton). In non-immigration 
proceedings in the United States, children regularly obtain appointed legal counsel in 
delinquency charges, civil suits, and abuse and neglect allegations. Id. To ensure a fair 
hearing, many states mandate the appointment of counsel, recognizing that children are 
not equipped to represent themselves. Id. In the case of In re Gault, the Court found that 
where a child faces a loss of liberty he or she must be afforded appropriate due process 
protections, including the right to counsel. 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967). Since immigration 
proceedings are not considered criminal in nature, noncitizens facing deportation do not 
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 Furthermore, the UACPA calls upon the Department of Justice to 
adopt the INS Guidelines in its handing of children’s asylum claims 
before immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals.173 
Currently, immigration judges are not required to follow the Guide-
lines in their adjudications.174 Additionally, immigration officials and 
personnel who come in contact with children are not required to re-
ceive training in children’s special needs and circumstances; the 
UACPA would make this training mandatory.175
 In addition, the UACPA incorporates provisions that would bring 
detention practices and policies more in line with the Flores Agree-
ment, the settlement that instituted nationwide detention procedures 
for children after Flores v. Reno.176 The class action suit in Flores chal-
lenged the INS policy of releasing children only to a legal guardian or 
parent except in unusual and extraordinary cases.177 The class of un-
accompanied children, who brought the suit, contended that the 
Constitution and immigration laws require them to be released into 
the custody of “responsible adults.”178 Since unaccompanied minors 
do not have parents or legal guardians, they are housed for long peri-
ods in juvenile or adult detention facilities.179 The Flores Agreement 
recognized two fundamental principles: (1) minors should be treated 
with “dignity, respect, and special concern for their particular vulner-
                                                                                                                      
have the right to court appointed counsel. See Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730 
(1893) (An “order of deportation is not a punishment for crime,” and therefore, “the pro-
visions of the Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreason-
able searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”). 
173 S. 119 § 401. Currently, the INS Guidelines are not binding, but rather recommen-
dations. INS Guidelines, supra note 28, at 1. 
174 Hearing, supra note 5, at 65 (statement of Julianne Duncan, Director of Children’s 
Services, United States Conference on Catholic Bishops). 
175 S. 119 § 401(b); Hearing, supra note 5, at 65 (statement of Julianne Duncan). 
176 See Flores v. Reno, 507 U.S. 292, 294 (1997); Hearing, supra note 5, at 38 (statement 
of Wendy Young). 
177 Flores, 507 U.S. at 292, 296. 
178 Id. at 294. 
179 Seugling, supra note 10, at 870–71. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the INS on 
several issues in Flores v. Reno, but the parties to the lawsuit were able to negotiate a settle-
ment on other key issues, including the detention, release, and treatment of minors in INS 
custody. Young, supra note 52, at 10. The Office of Inspector General found that majority 
of secure facilities used by INS did not segregate INS-detained children from delinquent 
youth; the Flores Agreement forbids this commingling. US Department of Justice, Of-
fice of the Inspector General, Unaccompanied Juveniles in INS Custody, (2001) available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0109/chapter1.htm [hereinafter Unaccompanied 
Juveniles]. 
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ability;” and (2) children should be held in the “least restrictive set-
ting possible” that is appropriate for their age and special needs.180
 Human rights groups and the Department of Justice Inspector 
General criticized the former INS for continued violations of the Flores 
Agreement.181 According to a 2003 Amnesty International report, forty-
eight percent of facilities surveyed admitted to housing immigrant 
children alongside juvenile offenders, and fifty-seven percent of those 
facilities said that they use solitary confinement to discipline chil-
dren.182 Although DHS has made progress since the Flores Agreement, 
the growth in the number of children arriving in the United States 
threatens to undermine its efforts due to the agency’s failure to commit 
the resources necessary to keep pace with this growth.183 The number 
                                                                                                                      
180 Young, supra note 52, at 10. When appropriate, the Flores Agreement provides for 
the release of a child from detention to an individual or entity willing to ensure the child’s 
safety and appearance in immigration court. Hearing, supra note 5, at 38 (statement of 
Wendy Young). The UACPA incorporates the Flores Agreement’s prompt release policy. 
See S. 119, at § 102(a)(1) (listing the order of preference for the child’s prompt placement 
as a parent, legal guardian, adult relative, entity designated by a parent, a state-licensed 
juvenile shelter, group home or foster care program, or a qualified adult or entity seeking 
custody of a child). 
181 Unaccompanied Juveniles, supra note 179 (noting that various groups reported al-
leged children’s rights violations at detention facilities in Arizona, California, and Pennsyl-
vania). Because of lack of shelter bed space to accommodate the number of children, the 
agency often resorts to detaining children in juvenile correctional facilities. Young, supra 
note 52, at 10. Furthermore, DHS deportation officers often base these determinations on 
law enforcement concerns. Id. The agency has an inherent conflict of interest in acting as 
the children’s caregiver, since its primary function is law enforcement. See id. To worsen 
matters, in 2000, DHS consolidated its children’s programs, including operation of the 
shelters, under its Detention and Removal branch. See Seugling, supra note 10, at 871. 
182 Amnesty International U.S.A., supra note 10, at 24, 32. The DHS detained 4136 
unaccompanied children for more than seventy-two hours, placing one-third of them in 
juvenile detention centers and a large majority of others in DHS shelter care during Fiscal 
Year 2000. Id. at 1. DHS shelter care is known as “soft detention,” where children wear 
street clothes, have educational classes and are not locked in a cell; nonetheless, their ac-
tivities are closely monitored and they are only occasionally allowed off the premises with 
shelter staff. Hearing, supra note 5, at 40 (statement of Wendy Young). The Women’s 
Commission for Refugees and Children notes that many children who have been incor-
rectly identified as adults are placed in adult detention centers. Id. at 46. The Commission 
states that the DHS should stop using dental radiograph exams as the sole means of identi-
fying children’s age because of the unreliability of these tests. Women’s Comm’n, supra 
note 9, at 16. Instead, the applicant should be given the benefit of the doubt if he or she 
claims to be under 18, and other age identifying evidence should be considered. Id. A 
review process should be implemented for negative age determinations. Id. 
183 See Young, supra note 52, at 11. DHS increased the number of available beds in non-
secure facilities for juveniles from 130 to 500 from FY 1997 to FY 2001, and has grants to 
open more shelter care facilities for unaccompanied juveniles. Hearing, supra note 5, at 17 
(statement of Stuart Anderson, Executive Associate Commissioner, INS). At any given 
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of children detained by DHS has increased from 4,615 to 6,200 from 
2001 to 2005.184
 In compliance with the Flores Agreement, the UACPA mandates 
that children not be placed in adult detention facilities or with other 
delinquent children unless the unaccompanied minor exhibits crimi-
nal behavior or is determined to be dangerous.185 It establishes clear 
guidelines for detention alternatives such as shelter care, foster care, 
and other child custody arrangements.186 The UACPA also prohibits 
the “unreasonable use” of shackling, handcuffing, solitary confine-
ment, and pat or strip searches, which may violate a child’s sense of 
dignity and respect.187
                                                                                                                      
time, about 475 unaccompanied minors are in INS custody; their ages range from six 
months to 17 years old. Id. at 63 (statement of Julianne Duncan). 
184 Nugent, supra note 4, at 9. The number of unaccompanied child detainees in the 
United States more than doubled from 2375 in 1997 to 5385 in 2001. Amnesty Interna-
tional U.S.A., supra note 10, at 1. Regardless of the quality of care provided, a Save the 
Children UK study finds that detention has damaging physical, mental health, and educa-
tional implications on children. Crawley & Lester, supra note 148, at 19, 24. Exacerbated 
by the lack of information associated with the asylum and detention process, children ex-
perience depression, behavioral changes, confusion, and retraumatization. Id. at 24. Being 
detained often leads children to abandon their claims, even if they face harm by returning 
to their home country. Id. at 22. 
185 S. 119, 109th Cong. § 103(a) (2005). The Flores Agreement only permits children to 
be housed in secure settings, i.e., juvenile jails in certain circumstances, such as when 1) a 
child is deemed a flight risk, 2) there has been an emergency influx of children, 3) a child’s 
safety is at risk, or 4) a child is chargeable, has been charged, or has been convicted of a 
crime. Young, supra note 52, at 10. 
186 S. 119 § 103. The child care provider must be licensed by an appropriate state 
agency to provide residential, child welfare, or foster care services. Id. § 103(a)(3). Section 
462 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provided for the transfer of the care and place-
ment of unaccompanied children from the now abolished INS to the Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement, but did not indicate a time 
frame for the transfer of custody. 77 Cong. Rec. S7019–20 (2003) (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein). Therefore, the children could be detained indefinitely in the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement. Areti Georgopoulos, Beyond the Reach of Juvenile Justice: The Crisis of 
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Detained by the United States, 23 Law & Ineq. 117, 138 
(2005). The UACPA rectifies this by specifying that the child shall be transferred to the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement no later than 72 hours after a determination is made that 
such child is an unaccompanied minor. S. 119 § 101(b)(3)(A). Prior to 2002, the INS De-
tention and Removal branch was responsible for children’s programs, which presented a 
conflict of interest. Hearing, supra note 5, at 36 (statement of Wendy Young). While this 
agency was charged with the protection of unaccompanied minors, it is also responsible 
for their apprehension, detention, and removal. Id. 
187 S. 119 § 103(b). Children are sometimes handcuffed and shackled during trans-
port, when they go to on-site medical facilities, or when they misbehave. Hearing, supra 
note 5, at 43 (statement of Wendy Young). At a Senate hearing on UACPA, Edwin Larios 
Munoz, who fled Honduras after being abandoned, testified about his detention experi-
ence in a jail for juvenile criminals. Hearing, supra note 5, at 27 (statement of Edwin Larios 
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 While the UACPA makes significant progress, Congress can greatly 
improve the UACPA by implementing a few changes.188 For example, 
the UACPA should provide for judicial review of placement decisions, 
so minors, who currently have no recourse, can challenge harmful 
placements.189 In addition, the UACPA charges the DHS Secretary and 
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) Director with promulgating 
regulations to provide for the educational, mental and physical health, 
and spiritual needs of detained children.190 Codification of these stan-
dards is crucial to protecting these children’s needs; yet rather than 
making them mandatory, enacting these regulations is left to the dis-
cretion of the DHS Secretary and ORR Director.191 Furthermore, the 
UACPA only specifies areas that should be addressed, but does not pro-
vide a minimum standard for these services.192
C. The Need to Apply the Best Interests Principle Comprehensively 
 The INS Guidelines and UACPA would help children attain fairer 
access to the asylum system and ensure that they are treated with 
greater respect.193 It is the asylum determination system itself, however, 
rather than the area of access where unaccompanied children are most 
disadvantaged.194
                                                                                                                      
Munoz). He stated that the officers treated him as a criminal, and hit him with sticks and 
sprayed him with pepper spray when they thought he was not obeying orders. Id. at 28. He 
said, “I lost weight and was usually sick at this jail since I could not eat the food . . . and the 
jail constantly smelled like urine. I cried a lot in the cell, wondering why everything was 
turning out so bad for me in the United States and wondering if I would ever be free.” Id. 
Munoz also hated wearing shackles to immigration court and was embarrassed by the strip 
down searches. Id. 
188 See Georgopoulos, supra note 186, at 150–51. 
189 Id. DHS deportation officers, who are primarily concerned with law enforcement, 
usually make such placement decisions; thus, judicial review by objective decisionmakers is 
needed. Young, supra note 52, at 11. 
190 S. 119, 109th Cong. § 103(a)(4)(A) (2005). The UACPA also gives detained chil-
dren access to telephones, legal services and interpreters. Id. As of 2002, many of the juve-
nile detention centers did not have access to translation assistance, phones, or religious 
services in their chosen faiths. Hearing, supra note 5, at 43–44 (statement of Wendy Young). 
Furthermore, many of the facilities used by DHS only provide education programs in Eng-
lish. Id. at 44. 
191 Georgopoulos, supra note 186, at 148. 
192 Id. 
193 See generally INS Guidelines, supra note 28 (providing greater procedural protec-
tions, such as creating a child-sensitive interviewing environment, help children speak 
more freely about their claims); S. 119 § 202 (providing children with attorneys will help 
them navigate a confusing asylum system with greater legal knowledge). 
194 See Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 243. 
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 Professor Bhadha contrasts the distinct hurdles faced by unac-
companied children in gaining asylum to that faced by female asylum 
seekers.195 She notes that women are disadvantaged in attaining access, 
but advantaged once within the system.196 Once they apply for asylum, 
women have a relative advantage in securing asylum due to a gradual 
awareness over the last two decades of the specificity of women’s rights 
in general and gender-based persecution in particular.197 Unaccompa-
nied children, on the other hand, are relatively privileged in obtaining 
access but disadvantaged in the asylum determination system itself.198 
Child-specific persecution has not been acknowledged as grounds for 
persecution in the asylum determination.199 Bhadha partially attributes 
unaccompanied children’s relative disadvantage in asylum grants to a 
bifurcated view of children.200 On the one hand they are vulnerable 
and in need of care; on the other hand they are viewed with suspicion 
and hostility as delinquent street children and gang members.201 Chil-
dren are also detained longer than the general population, because 
immigration judges hesitate to issue final removal orders to unaccom-
panied children and often continue their cases multiple times.202
 Therefore, by stopping short of reforming the substantive criteria 
for asylum, the INS Guidelines and UACPA still disadvantage unac-
companied children and ignore their best interests in the actual asylum 
                                                                                                                      
195 Id. at 239–40. 
196 See id. She attributes women’s disadvantage in accessing the system to the criminali-
zation of migration and women’s low socio-economic status given the cost of securing 
commercial assistance. Id. at 238. 
197 Id. at 239. 
198 Id. at 242. Unaccompanied children are over-represented in the asylum system. Ac-
cording to UNHCR, they account for four percent of the total number of asylum applica-
tions lodged in seventeen European countries for which data was available, but they only 
account for less than 2.5 percent of the total refugee and asylum seeking population. Id. at 
233–34. In Hungary and the Netherlands, they accounted for 15 percent of all the applica-
tions filed in 2000. Id. at 234. In the United Kingdom, the number of unaccompanied 
children seeking asylum grew from two percent in 1995 to eight percent in 2000. Id. The 
United States does not keep a record of how many unaccompanied minors apply for asy-
lum. Seugling, supra note 10, at 864. 
199 See Seugling, supra note 10, at 891. 
200 Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 240–41. 
201 Id. 
202 Hearing, supra note 5, at 50–51 (statement of Andrew Morton). Malik Jarno, the 
twelve-year-old orphan who was recently granted asylum, was detained for three years in 
adult detention centers. Nugent, supra note 4, at 9. Isau Diego, who fled from an abusive 
parent and a life on the streets of Honduras, spent two years in detention before being 
deported, including more than a year in secure detention. Hearing, supra note 5, at 34 
(statement of Wendy Young). 
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determination.203 For example, the INS Guidelines and the UACPA 
would not have made a difference for Edgar Chocoy, since gang vio-
lence on a former member does not fall within the scope of one of the 
enumerated grounds.204 If his best interests were considered as a crite-
ria for asylum, however, Chocoy’s life may have been saved.205 Thus, by 
restricting the best interests principle to the area of access, the INS 
Guidelines and UACPA do not ensure that unaccompanied children 
are kept safe from dangerous situations.206
 The best interests standard should be applied substantively be-
cause offering sanctuary to children who reasonably fear persecution 
furthers U.S. humanitarian and foreign policy.207 By accepting a greater 
share of the world’s most vulnerable children, the United States can 
improve its public image among other nations.208 Additionally, given 
the increasing importance of international law, any framework for de-
termining child asylum claims should consider the provisions of human 
rights instruments.209 Therefore, the United States should abide by the 
CRC’s best interests principle in reforming its asylum law for unaccom-
panied minors, even when other policy goals, such as immigration con-
trol, dominate.210
                                                                                                                      
203 See Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 243 (“Separated children need 
to have the specificity of their persecution acknowledged, as falling within the refugee 
definition, so that being inducted as a child soldier, threatened with imprisonment or 
physical abuse because of familial political affiliations, beaten as a street child, refused 
treatment as an autistic child, or sold as a child sex worker or domestic labourer are ac-
knowledged as potential aspects of persecution.”). 
204 See Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (noting that child abuse, 
child selling, child trafficking, and other forms of child-specific persecution are not con-
sidered protected under the five enumerated grounds). 
205 See Villarreal, supra note 32, at 777 (stating that the current substantive standards 
leave many unaccompanied children without protection and that the government should 
address this problem using the best interests principle). 
206 See Bhabha, Demography & Rights, supra note 37, at 243. 
207 Steinbock, supra note 23, at 188. 
208 Id. at 188–89 (noting that there are instances where children may not gain asylum 
under the enumerated grounds but nonetheless deserve sanctuary in the United States in 
light of international norms, and citing the example of child soldiers because interna-
tional protocols condemn recruitment of children under 15); see id. at 170 (discussing 
foreign policy objective that may be relieving asylum countries of the burden of caring for 
children). 
209 See discussion, supra Part II.B.1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (not-
ing that Justice Kennedy cited to a case decided in the European Court of Human Rights 
in his majority opinion because he thought there was nothing to suggest that government 
interest in proscribing sodomy was more compelling in this country than in others). 
210 See Bhabha, Lone Travelers, supra note 147, at 281. The CRC states that child refu-
gees under the CRC should be afforded “protection and humanitarian assistance in the 
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IV. Implementing the Best Interests Principle in Substantive 
Reforms for Unaccompanied Minors Seeking Asylum 
 The United States should consider the best interests of the unac-
companied minor seeking asylum similarly to how it currently deter-
mines eligibility for the special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS).211 
The purpose of the SIJS provision is to alleviate hardship for many 
dependent alien juveniles by giving them the opportunity to apply for 
special immigrant classification and lawful permanent resident status, 
with the possibility of becoming U.S. citizens.212 To be eligible for 
SIJS, the minor first must have been declared dependent on a juvenile 
court or been placed in the care of a child welfare agency.213 Second, 
the child must be deemed eligible for long-term foster care due to 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.214 Third, a court must find that it is 
not in the child’s best interest to be returned to his or her home 
country.215 This opportunity for legal status should not be limited to 
this narrow category of children who qualify for SIJS because unac-
companied minors who suffer other child-specific harms are no less 
deserving of protection.216
                                                                                                                      
enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention . . . .” CRC, supra note 
40, at art. 22(1), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 51. 
211 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 1015 (noting that the SIJS only helps a narrow 
population of children and urging that the best interests principle be used in all decisions 
regarding immigrant children). In many areas of American jurisprudence, including tort, 
contract, and criminal law, a different legal standard applies to children because of their 
age. Nogosek, supra note 36, at 14. In tort and contract law, children are provided with 
substantive protections that are designed to shield them from the severity of adult legal 
standards. Id. In criminal law, child defendants benefit from a separate court system, de-
signed with the goal of rehabilitating minors. Id. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated: “Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, espe-
cially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particu-
larly during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the ex-
perience, perspective and judgment expected of adults.” 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) 
(finding that youth must be considered a relevant mitigating factor in determining capital 
punishment for a sixteen year old); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) 
(holding that execution of children under 18 at the time of their capital crimes is prohib-
ited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
212 Special Immigrant Status Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,843, 42,844 (Aug. 12, 1993). 
213 INA § 101(a)(27)( J)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J)(i) (2000). 
214 Id. To qualify for long-term foster care, a court must determine that family reunifi-
cation is no longer a viable option. Thronson, supra note 35, at 1006. 
215 INA § 101(a)(27)( J)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J)(ii) (2000). 
216 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 1015; Bhabha, Lone Travelers, supra note 147, at 281 
(stating that state intervention should not be limited to circumstances of child exploitation 
or neglect). Also there is little, if any, evidence that applying a more flexible standard for 
children would result in a dramatic surge in children’s asylum claims in the United States. 
Bien, supra note 117, at 830–31. 
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 The special immigrant juvenile status is the only provision in im-
migration law to make the best interests of the child an eligibility re-
quirement.217 The SIJS creates a unique hybrid system of state and fed-
eral collaboration, where child welfare experts make the best interests 
determinations and DHS officials decide immigration matters, such as 
the applicability of grounds of inadmissibility and waivers.218 The spe-
cial immigrant juvenile status therefore incorporates the best interests 
principle into immigration law for the first time and allows those who 
are better qualified about child welfare issues to make that determina-
tion.219 Like the SIJS adjudication, a juvenile court or other independ-
ent body with child welfare expertise, not DHS, should make the best 
interests finding in the case of unaccompanied children asylum seek-
ers.220
 An INS memorandum regarding the SIJS states that evidence is 
required to show that removing the child from the United State would 
not be in the child’s best interests, but it does not specify what kind of 
documentation would suffice.221 Social workers, probation officers, or 
others writing reports to the court should discuss their efforts to de-
termine the conditions for the child in the home country, the condi-
tions for the child in the United States, and the basis for their rec-
ommendation that it is not in the child’s best interest to return to her 
home country.222 The plain language of the statute requires an ad-
ministrative or judicial determination that it would not be in the best 
interest to return the child to her previous country, but not direct evi-
dence about the conditions in the home country itself.223 Thus, it is 
unclear whether the country conditions and home studies on parents 
                                                                                                                      
217 Thronson, supra note 35, at 1004; see INA § 101(a)(27)( J)(ii); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)( J)(ii) (stating that a determination must be made on whether it would be in 
the alien’s best interest to be returned to his or her previous country). 
218 See INA § 101(a)(27)( J); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J); Thronson, supra note 35, at 
1004, 1008. 
219 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 1004. 
220 See id. 
221 Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Commissioner Adjudications 
Division, to the Regional, District, and Service Center Directors and Regional and District 
Counsel ( July 9, 1999), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/Adj 
Mem0135Pub.pdf [hereinafter SIJS Memorandum]. 
222 Sally Kinoshita & Katherine Brady, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Spe-
cial Immigrant Juvenile Status for Children Under Juvenile Court Jurisdiction 18 
(2005), available at http://www.ilrc.org/resources/sijs/2005%20SIJS%20manual%20com 
plete.pdf [hereinafter ILRC MANUAL]. 
223 See INA § 101(a)(27)( J)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J)(ii) (2000); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.11(c)(6) (2005) (repeating the statutory language that a court or administrative 
body must have made the finding). 
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or other potential caretakers in the country of origin should be sub-
mitted to meet DHS demands.224
 While the SIJS law makes significant strides in treating children 
more humanely, child advocates argue that a 1997 amendment re-
moves too much power from juvenile courts.225 The amendment re-
quired the Attorney General’s consent to the SIJS proceeding in juve-
nile court for children who are in DHS custody.226 Children who are 
apprehended at the border, therefore, must obtain DHS consent to 
the jurisdiction of juvenile court, while those who are already in the 
United States do not have to obtain consent.227 According to an INS 
memorandum to its regional and district directors, this consent 
“should be given if (1) the juvenile would be eligible for SIJS if a de-
pendency order is issued, and (2) in the judgment of the district di-
rector, the dependency proceeding would be in the best interests of 
the juvenile.”228 Child advocates criticize this approach because it al-
lows DHS to prejudge precisely the issue that the statute places before 
the juvenile court—the best interests of the child.229 Nevertheless, the 
design of the SIJS law recognizes, at least in theory, that there is a 
critical difference between DHS and the juvenile court.230 With some 
additional safeguards to ensure that DHS does not circumvent the 
                                                                                                                      
224 ILRC MANUAL, supra note 222, at 18. 
225 Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 
Stat. 2460 (1997) (statute codified as amended at INA § 101(a)(27)( J)(iii); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)( J)(iii) (2000)); see, e.g., Katherine Porter, Note, In the Best Interests of the INS: An 
Analysis of the 1997 Amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. Legis. 441, 442 
(2001). 
226 § 113, 111 Stat. at 2460 (codified as amended at INA § 101(a)(27)( J)(iii); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)( J)(iii)). A juvenile court’s dependency order is invalid if it does not first 
obtain the Attorney General’s consent to the jurisdiction. SIJS Memorandum, supra note 
221. For children not in DHS custody, the DHS has little discretion after the juvenile court 
issues a dependency order. Id. Consent must be given if the juvenile court makes the re-
quired findings. Id. 
227 Thronson, supra note 35, at 1005. 
228 SIJS Memorandum, supra note 221. Furthermore, while the SIJS has been codified 
for over a decade, authorities have yet to promulgate regulations that would direct DHS on 
when consent to access state dependency proceedings is mandatory. Nugent, supra note 4, 
at 11. According to advocates, many abused, abandoned, and neglected children in ORR 
care still do not receive DHS consent because no binding regulations have been passed. Id. 
229 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 1010; Porter, supra note 225, at 442. Advocates rec-
ommend that, at a minimum, the consent function should be transferred from DHS Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement to DHS Citizenship and Immigration Services, since 
the latter has expertise in immigration benefits adjudication. Nugent, supra note 4, at 11. 
230 Thronson, supra note 35, at 1009. 
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design, the SIJS can meaningfully balance the best interests of the 
child and the need for immigration control.231
 The SIJS law serves as a model for reform of the United States 
asylum law for unaccompanied children by using the best interests 
principle as the main criteria instead of requiring that the child’s 
harm fall within the scope of the five enumerated grounds for asy-
lum.232 The unaccompanied child asylum seeker would have to dem-
onstrate that 1) it is in her best interests not to return to her country 
of origin, and 2) she fears or suffered harm that the government in 
her home country was unwilling or unable to prevent.233 This two-
prong decision-making process before an independent body with 
child welfare expertise and DHS, respectively, remedies the difficulty 
of applying the traditional refugee definition to unaccompanied chil-
dren.234 It also locates the best interests determination in an inde-
pendent body, removing a potential conflict of interest in asking DHS 
to consider the children’s interest while carrying out its law enforce-
ment or adjudicatory functions.235
Conclusion 
 Current American asylum law jeopardizes the protection of thou-
sands of children who have fled poverty, hardship, and persecution to 
arrive in this country.236 These unaccompanied children are especially 
vulnerable to a broad array of human rights violations as children and 
refugees without an adult caretaker.237 While other areas of U.S. juris-
prudence recognize that children have unique vulnerabilities and 
                                                                                                                      
231 See id. at 1008 (discussing the “workable balance” of the statute). The UACPA 
makes improvements to the SIJS classification. See generally S. 119, 109th Cong. § 301 
(2005). First, it would make the juvenile court’s dependency declaration binding on the 
Secretary of DHS. S. 119 § 301(a)(i). Second, the bill would not require the AG’s consent 
for children in DHS custody to start the SIJS proceedings; instead, the bill would allow the 
ORR to certify that a minor’s application for SIJS is valid. See S. 119 § 301(a)(iii). 
232 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 1015 (stating that reforms to safeguard the best in-
terests principle in the SIJS law are not sufficient; the best interests principle should be 
applied to a wider population of unaccompanied children). 
233 See discussion supra Part II.A. DHS could also deny the unaccompanied minor asy-
lum if she falls under one of the grounds of inadmissibility. See generally INA § 212; 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1182 (2000) (listing the grounds of inadmissibility). 
234 See Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone, supra note 11, at 143 (noting that child abuse, 
child selling, child trafficking, and other forms of child-specific persecution are not con-
sidered protected under the five enumerated grounds). 
235 See Thronson, supra note 35, at 1015 (discussing the DHS’s conflict of interest in 
making the best interests determination). 
236 Nugent, supra note 4, at 9. 
237 See Seugling, supra note 10, at 888. 
168 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:131 
provide separate legal standards to shield them from the severity of 
adult laws, asylum law makes no such distinctions between children 
and adults. 238 Children are forced to meet the same evidentiary and 
legal standards as adults.239 In an asylum system designed primarily 
for adults, unaccompanied children experience difficulty meeting the 
specialized categories for gaining asylum.240 Moreover, without repre-
sentation or a guardian ad litem, children are pitted against a trial 
attorney in an unfamiliar language, where the stakes are sometimes a 
matter of life or death.241
 The human rights and children’s rights movements have advanced 
the best interests of the child both domestically and abroad, as demon-
strated by American family law jurisprudence and the widespread ac-
ceptance of the CRC globally.242 While the United States has taken 
steps to acknowledge the interests of unaccompanied minors through 
the INS Guidelines and UACPA, it has restricted best interests consid-
erations to procedural matters. Thus, unaccompanied children are still 
marginalized in the actual legal determination.243 To ensure that unac-
companied children are not deported into harmful situations, the 
United States must consider the best interests of the child in their asy-
lum applications.244 By replacing the current criteria with a program 
that mirrors the SIJS law, unaccompanied minors may finally attain the 
legal support they have long-since needed and deserved.245
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